

FACTS:

1. CIA does not have a clearly defined concept of Briefing.

a) There is a tendency to regard the Central Processing Branch/ Personnel Division Covert as the unit in the Agency responsible for the preparation of an individual for assignment to an overseas post of duty. This is a misconception to the extent that it implies a responsibility beyond the strict limitations of processing and imputes a responsibility for general briefing. The Central Processing Branch is just that—a processing branch.

b) There has been no attempt to make a distinction among EOD orientation and indoctrination, on-the-job training, and briefing.

c) There has been no organized attempt to determine and define the kinds and quantities of information an individual needs to know in order to make a transfer to a foreign post of duty.

2. CIA has not heretofore recognized a responsibility to the individual in making a transfer from the United States to an overseas post of duty from the standpoint of the personal essential requirements of breaking up house-keeping in the U.S. to becoming established and reasonably adjusted in a foreign society.

a) Some units of the Agency have unilaterally attempted to give maximum assistance to persons transferring overseas. The Office of Communications, for example, has developed a complete, formal procedure for the specific purpose of providing adequate preparation for Commo personnel being assigned to it overseas stations.

b) In contrast some other units of the Agency appear to be unconcerned and are willing to rely completely on the information an individual can collect for himself, together with that which he will receive in the Central Processing Branch.

3. The Agency has never placed responsibility nor delegated authority for the organization, performance and supervision of a cohesive program to prepare individuals for assignment overseas.

4. Briefing and general information given to contract personnel is completely informal and disorganized.

a) Security considerations prohibit the processing of contract personnel in CIA areas and buildings.

b) Such information as is given to contract personnel is presented by the individual case officer who is responsible for conducting the negotiations with the prospective contractor.

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c: The position of case officer for the most part is flexible and subject to a very high degree of turnover. Case officers are frequently persons who are in the process of training while awaiting assignment overseas. The most accurate information available indicates that there is no formal organized training available to case officers which would qualify them to represent the Agency in conducting contract negotiations. There is no assurance that the majority of case officers have been adequately trained in Agency personnel or finance policies nor is there any assurance that they have been adequately "briefed" themselves not to mention their general qualifications to brief prospective contractors.

5. There is evidence of improperly exercised supervisory responsibility: Basically, it is the responsibility of the individual supervisor to ensure that personnel under his supervision are properly oriented, indoctrinated, and trained. The provision of general orientation, training, and briefing programs does not absolve the supervisor from his responsibility. Procedures for centralized orientation, briefing, training, and processing are provided as a service to facilitate Agency administration, but it remains the responsibility of the individual supervisor to ensure that personnel under his jurisdiction have been given maximum advantage of these services and received all information essential to their personal welfare as it is related to the duties and assignment they must perform for this Agency.

6. CIA has neither recognized nor assumed responsibility for the briefing of dependents. On rare occasions, when dependents are in the Washington area and when the employee makes the request, dependents may be processed through the Central Processing Branch/Personnel Division Covert. The vast majority of cases, however, the information as is made available to dependents is given to them informally by the employee, if at all.

DISCUSSION:

A. Briefing Concept and Definition.

1. The very first and most essential problem with which the Agency must be concerned in this regard is the statement of a clearly defined concept of briefing and what it purports to accomplish. Briefing must be delimited to the extent that it will be distinct from general orientation, indoctrination and on-the-job training, and will be supplementary to the actual processing of an individual in preparing him to travel to an overseas post of duty. In order that this may be accomplished there must be a substantive analysis of the Agency Personnel Policies, Training Courses, Indoctrination and Orientation procedures, and on-the-job training to which an individual is exposed in the process of his acclimatization to CIA employment. This is necessary because the content of briefing will be determined by what substantive Additional information an individual should have in order effect his transfer overseas. By the time an individual is to be specifically prepared for an overseas assignment it should be possible to fairly assume that he is in command of, and thoroughly familiar with, certain substantive, basic information which would,

therefore, not be necessary for inclusion in briefing materials and procedures. Obviously, it will be necessary to know what this information and knowledge is before the concept and substantive content of comprehensive briefing can be determined.

2. For purposes of this discussion, briefing may be defined as the process of advising and assisting an employee and his dependents to arrange their personal affairs in the U.S., to prepare themselves and their property for overseas movement, to travel comfortably and conveniently to the overseas post, to establish residence, to maintain themselves under local living condition for the entire period of overseas duty, and to make reasonable mental adjustment to their environment.

3. CIA must recognize that there is an Agency responsibility to every individual assigned overseas. This responsibility is personal to the individual and must be personalized to the extent that each person knows when, where, and how he is going overseas; what he must do to be prepared to go; what he may encounter en route; and what he can generally expect to find upon arrival at his post.

4. Heretofore CIA has neglected its personal responsibility and concentrated on the formalized "processing" necessary merely to move the individual, his family and personal effects. The Central Processing Branch is responsible for these procedures which are of a purely technical nature. There has been a tendency, however, to assume that the Central Processing Branch would, in conjunction with its processing procedures, undertake all other factors basic to proper preparation for overseas assignment. This is a misconception. The Central Processing Branch is not equipped, is not responsible and should not be expected, under present procedures, to perform any function other than technical processing. Misguided pressures have resulted in the assumption of additional functions by the Central Processing Branch toward the provision of some personal guidance and assistance. It must be emphasized, however, that to the extent that the Central Processing Branch has introduced supplementary information into its technical processing procedures, it has performed a purely gratuitous function, the responsibility for which lies elsewhere.

B. Responsibility for Briefing

1. Before responsibility for Briefing can be appropriately assigned, it must be clearly defined, and a carefully delimited concept must be developed.

If the definition set forth in paragraph A-2 above is accepted for purposes of this paper, responsibility for briefing can be limited accordingly.

2. The Central Processing Branch is currently responsible for the technical processing of employees necessary to place them in a travel status to the point of destination. This includes, but is not limited to, such items as arranging travel itinerary, procurement of passports, visas and tickets; arranging for medical examinations and inoculations; preparing the foreign duty data sheet and explaining salary payments, allowances, insurance, and other allotments, and other essential financial matters; and for obtaining draft board and military reserve permission for the person to leave the country in addition to other personnel matters. It is emphasized that these responsibilities are purely processing, and they should be restricted to that phase so far as Central Processing Branch is concerned.

3. Responsibility for other briefing and preparation for overseas assignment resides with the individual supervisor concerned. To a large extent, this responsibility has been neglected, and in some cases, completely ignored. There is no doubt that this situation is at least partly due to the failure on the part of the Agency to effectively assign the responsibility and give guidance and direction to the development of the concept, standards, or principles to govern briefing.

4. Lack of Agency policy notwithstanding some units of the Agency have unilaterally developed detailed procedures and comprehensive information for the briefing of overseas personnel. The Office of Communications, for example, has developed and instituted detailed procedures under the authority and guidance of the Chief, Administrative Staff. The Office of Communications has established a detailed outline of information necessary to thoroughly brief and has required that all stations under Commo jurisdiction submit post reports in conformance thereto. A copy of the Commo outline, sample post reports, and a copy of the Commo briefing procedure for integrated personnel are attached hereto for illustrative purposes. These materials illustrate the kinds of materials and procedures essential to adequate briefing. Each area desk is responsible for providing appropriate briefing for each individual in the particular area of concern to that desk. The Administrative Staff, Office of Communications, however, is responsible for exercising appropriate controls and for ensuring that each individual assigned overseas anywhere within Commo jurisdiction, has been properly briefed and prepared for his assignment.

5. To the best of our present knowledge, there is no comparable system or procedure in the office of Clandestine Services. If there is a valid analogy, it would appear desirable that the Chief,

Administration, DD/P be responsible for, and establish comparable procedures for ensuring that each individual has an equal opportunity to be adequately prepared for his overseas assignment.

6. In this general connection, it is conceivable that the Central Processing Branch can provide an additional service. If the various area Divisions fulfill their responsibilities in making adequate information available via post reports, bibliographies, etc, the Central Processing Branch would seem the logical place for locating the materials developed and prepared. In this manner all possible information could be made available to any individual in the Agency who is preparing to transfer to a given foreign area. Nearly all information, except strictly operational and cover briefing, could then be available at one central point. The responsibility of the individual supervisor could then be directed toward maintaining adequate information for placement in the Central Processing Branch, ensuring that each employee under his jurisdiction has adequate opportunity to take advantage of the facilities thus available, and determining that each individual has been satisfactorily prepared for his assignment through exposure to these facilities.

C. Briefing of Contract Personnel

1. Briefing of contract personnel must be conducted entirely through the case officer. It is there^{fore} the basic responsibility of the supervisor of each case officer to ensure that his case officers have adequate background, experience and training to sufficiently qualify them to negotiate as representatives of this Agency. The supervisor of each case officer must be held strictly accountable for the representations made to prospective contractors on behalf of the United States Government and CIA. Case Officers should be the most thoroughly indoctrinated, adequately trained, experienced personnel in the Agency insofar as possible. It would seem to be most desirable to develop stability and reduce turnover and flexibility in the position of case officer in order to ensure consistent general Agency policies toward the recruitment, negotiation, and assignment of covert contract personnel.

2. Case officers should be trained intensively in Agency recruitment and general personnel policies as well as thoroughly indoctrinated in processing and briefing techniques. The Case Officer must substitute for personnel recruitment, security, indoctrination, Agency orientation, on-the-job training, and every other phase of the EOD procedure which is available to appointed personnel. Each case officer is a representative of CIA and insofar as his negotiations with prospective contract personnel are concerned, the case officer is, in effect, CIA and must therefore be qualified to speak with the authority and knowledge of CIA

3. There can be no doubt that a major part of the difficulty in processing contract personnel is caused by failure of CIA to clearly define contract principles and covert personnel policies. Part XIV of the Confidential Funds Regulations defines categories, but there are no principles nor standards for contract personnel recruitment and no formal procedures for contractual negotiation. There is no source of information, therefore, which could be used for training case officers. They must learn by bungling, and cannot, in present circumstances, be held completely responsible because the Agency has not met its responsibilities in this regard. These policies and procedures should be formalized with the utmost dispatch if case officer training and contract negotiation are to be improved.

D. Briefing of Dependents

1. Briefing of dependents presents an extremely complicated problem, and raises the basic question of the desirability of subjecting dependents to security clearance and some select phases of EOD processing concurrently with the employee. There are arguments which can be submitted in justification for such a procedure generally, but which are beyond the scope of this study. For purposes here, it is enough to define the problem of briefing as it relates to dependents in preparation for overseas assignment of the employee upon whom they are dependent.

2. For purposes of employee briefing, the scope has already been limited to that phase which relates particularly to his transfer overseas. This is partly based upon the assumption that the employee has absorbed certain basic, substantive information during the process of entering on duty, being oriented, indoctrinated and trained. Dependents do not have ^{the} benefit of this acclimatizing process.

3. The basic determination essential for the Agency to make, therefore, is the extent to which the Agency should assume responsibility for briefing dependents. Having made this determination, it then becomes necessary to define the concept of dependent briefing and the substantive material and information to which they should be exposed. Further, it is essential that special devices and procedures be developed to accomplish the briefing of dependents.

4. Not the least significant factor in the problem of briefing dependents is their location. Dependents living or available in the Washington area can be relatively simply injected into Agency briefing processes available to employees. Dependents who are not within reasonable traveling distance of Washington, however, must be made knowledgeable through some other technique as yet undetermined.

5. The desirability of preparing briefing materials in unclassified form is emphasized not only to meet the needs of dependents distant from Washington, but for transmitted to the employee for his periodic review.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The problem of briefing in CIA is multiple and complex and requires comprehensive, detailed study for resolution.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Personnel Studies Staff of the Office of Personnel be assigned the project of studying the briefing problem toward the development of an Agency concept and definition of briefing, the establishment of necessary procedures, and the appropriate placement of responsibility among units of the Agency concerned with overseas assignees.
2. That a procedure be developed so that information needed to provide proper briefing is secured on an efficient and timely basis and is distributed to the appropriate briefing points. This information is presently not uniformly available nor is it properly distributed. Foreign Service reports should be maintained on a current basis. CIA should develop its own supplementary post reports and a system for securing reports from travellers so that information concerning current problems and helpful suggestions on travel to every point in the world is maintained.
3. That as much briefing material as possible be reduced to writing in the form of post reports, travel guides, etc., and that wherever possible such material be unclassified and be given to the traveller for use by himself and his dependents. That bibliographies be prepared listing recommended basic reading on every post or area in order that personnel may orient themselves as much as possible to the conditions they will encounter at their post of duty.
4. That a reading room be provided wherein all personnel can study, review and take notes at their leisure on information which will be necessary or useful to them.
5. That interviewers and advisors be provided in the Central Processing Branch (as at the present time) to give personnel whatever supplementary advice, guidance and processing assistance as may be necessary.
6. That a comprehensive check list be devised covering the entire concept of briefing as it may be developed and be applied as a control mechanic by Central Processing Branch to ensure fulfillment of the briefing program.
7. These materials should be available to all case officers. Each case officer should be required to thoroughly study all information related to the area of his concern.
8. Division Chiefs and supervisory officials should be held strictly accountable for ensuring that complete, correct information is available to all individuals assigned within their jurisdictions.
9. Dependents in the Washington area should be processed through the Central Processing Branch, and should have access to the proposed

Reading Room. Security procedures should be adopted to make this possible. Dependents outside the Washington Area where it is not feasible to process them formally should have materials made available to them through declassification of information, or by the extraction of information by the employee for transmittal to his dependents. This briefing should include teen age children.

10. Field Installations should be encouraged to report situations and evidences of faulty briefing and weaknesses in administration to Headquarters. The Central Processing Branch should be the focal point for the receipt of these reports inasmuch as many shortcomings in present procedures can be eliminated there. Problems reported which are not properly the concern of the CPB should be forwarded to the appropriate authority for corrective action. Such problems will have to be met on an individual basis.

11. The CPB, the Cover Division, Area Divisions, and all other units responsible for assignment of Personnel overseas should be charged with coordinate responsibility for the development of procedures and maintenance of information essential to the briefing requirements of the Agency in conjunction with the study recommended in 1 above.